Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

Loa Johnson v. Elizabeth F. Syme : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Johnson v. Syme, No. 8547 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2641

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

\)
I.

In the Supretne Court
of the State of Utah

FILED
1957
~Er~ L:l:-

LOA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellfrizt,~ ' ·

---------· ____ .., ___ ......
1e Court, Ct:•h

vs.

ELIZABETH F. SYME,
Administratrix· of the Estate of Bailey
Syme, Deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.

No. 8547

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page

STATEMENT OF FACTS _____________________ ----------------------------------------

3

STATEMENT OF POINTS ------------------------------------------------------------

6

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES --------------------------------------------

6

POINT I THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT
CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER
OF LAW ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

POINT II THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT
PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO
HER IN JURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW -------------------- 10
POINT III AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DECEASED
COULD NOT BE CHARGED WITH WILFUL OR
WANTON MISCONDUCT -------------------------------------------- 12
CON CLUSI 0 N --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
CITATIONS:
Cases

Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah (2d) 378, 294 Pac. 2d
7 8 8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Hicks v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514 ------------------

9

Martin v. Skinner, (Utah) 243 Pac. (2d) 747 ------------------------

9

Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 495 ----------------

9

Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah (2d) 224, 265 Pac. (2d) 401 --------

7

Spiller v. Griffen, 95 S.E. 133, 109 S.C. 78 ------------------------------ 14
State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 Pac. (2d) 457 ------------------ 14
State v. Barker, 113 Utah 514, 196 Pac. (2d) 723 ------------------ 15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jrexts

Page

1 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice

Section 6 8 2 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

8

4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile 'Law and Practice

Section 27 61 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
II
I

Section 2771 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Section 2 77 6 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supretne Court
of the State of Utah
LOA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ELIZABETH F. SYME,
Administratrix of the Estate of Bailey
Syme, Deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.

No. 8547

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent generally incorporates herein the
statement of facts set forth in appellants' brief as reflecting the record in this proceeding. May we, however, reiterate certain portions thereof in addition to
certain parts of the record to afford a clear understanding of the respondent's position and the basis of the
holding of Judge A. H. Ellett in the lower court.
3
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For reference purposes, the record herein will he
cited as follows: (BR) as indicating the appellant's brief;
(D) as indicating the deposition of the appellant; and
(T) as indicating the transcript.
Initially, the appellant frequently traveled and was
familiar with the portion of U.S. 91 where this intersection is situated and where the mishap occurred. (D-10).
Some 600 feet directly south of the (CT" intersection, a
sign indicated to northbound traffic that a roadway
leading east to the City of Draper was directly ahead.
(BR-2). The appellant was proceeding north at a speed
of from 50 to 55 miles per hour where the speed limit
was 50 miles per hour. (BR-2). It was then night, but
visibility was good. (BR-5). The road surface was wet,
but not puddled, and the surrounding terrain was of
open farm lands without any concealing growth or improvements which would obstruct or interfere with the
vision or observation of drivers proceeding north, as was
the appellant. (BR-4-5) Both of the vehicles involved
in this accident had the headlights on at the time of the
accident (T -18)
The appellant stated in her deposition that she :first
observed the deceased's automobile when it was ttstraight"
in front of her and when deceased's automobile was at
a distance from her of only ((between twenty or thirty
feet" and proceeding west across appellant's lane of traffic. (D-13-17) Appellant stated, when asked the speed
at which deceased was proceeding
(CA. He wasn't going very fast. He was just barely moving, if not standing still, practically.
He looked to me, when I first seen him, like
he was almost parked, but he must have been
moving a little." ( D-14)
4
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and she thereafter made a guess as the deceased's speed of
((ten or twenty miles an hour, probably." (D-14)
The appellant's automobile collided and came into
contact with deceased's car somewhere in the area of the
right door, (D-14) and at a point on the pavement close
to the west shoulder of the northbound traffic lanes of
U.S. 91 (D-14).
No issue is, by this proceeding, before the court as
to the deceased's negligence.
From appellant's proposed proof, the physical evidence would establish that the decedant traveled west
from the said stop sign 30 feet before arriving at the
easterly edge of the pavement of U.S. 91, across the 24
foot easterly lane of North bound traffic and across the
16 foot westerly lane of north bound traffic and his
front wheels had gone west of the westerly edge of the
pavement at the time of impact-a total distance in excess of 70 feet-at a speed that was ((barely moving."
(BR-1-2)
This movement of the deceased was clearly discernible by witnesses who were proceeding under the same
circumstances and conditions as the appellant, but who
were behind her ((a block" and who had, therefore, a
proportionate disadvantage of observation. (B-5) In fact,
one of the witnesses appellant proposed to call and who
was following appellant ((a block" would have testified,
according to appellant, that he observed the movement
of the deceased from a point 3 00 feet east of the stop
sign right up to the time of impact (BR-4)
The foregoing evidence adduced by the published deposition of the appellant, stipulations of counsel and certain informal proffers made by counsel, which are not
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

here controverted, formed the fact basis for Judgt. ' 1.lett's ruling that as a matter of law no facts were _I;Iesented which would support the counter claim of the
respondent and that the appellant was guilty of con
butory negligence as a matter of law. Appeal was ta~ .1
by the plaintiff on the issue of contributory neglige.i . e
and therefater the defendant cross appealed from the
ruling on her counter claim.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I.
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

POINT NO. II.
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO HER
IN JURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW.

POINT NO. III.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DECEASED COULD
NOT BE CHARGED WITH WILFUL OR WANTON
MISCONDUCT.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

As recited in the statement of facts, the intersection with which we are here concerned is a uT" inter6
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sr. ~n on a divided highway. The Draper road
intersects only the northbound traffic on U.S. 91 which,
in turn, is separated from southbound traffic by an island
• ·r.- ;feet in width.
This physical condition is such that a
t ;;~.lYer proceeding north as appellant, has to concern himS'..Jfi only and exclusively with traffic moving in the same
d~rection or with vehicles entering the highway in front
oi him at the intersection. The terrain is flat, the highw 1y is perfectly straight and there are no obstruction of
any nature which would prevent northbound drivers
from observing the movement of other vehicles approaching, or at the intersection.
Under these physical circumstances, the uncontroverted evidence is that the appellant was northbound on
U.S. 91 in the westerly lane, traveling between 50
and 55 at about 11:00 P.M. and completely failed to
observe the deceased's automobile or its headlights until
it was ((straight ahead" of appellant and ((barely moving." This, even though the deceased's automobile had
its headlights on and had proceeded at least 70 feet past
the stop sign and in front of appellant. Appellant has admitted that she was looking ahead prior to the collision, and, as stat.ed in Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d 224,
265 P. 2d 401, 404,
(( ... there was but one demand upon plaintiff's attention. There is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion as to where her attention should
have been concentrated; ... that she failed to use
due care in doing so is manifest from the evidence."
The lower court has rightly concluded that this admitted complete failure of the appellant to observe de-

7
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ceased's automobile under obvious circumstances, constituted negligence as a matter of law.
((A motorist must use his eyes and see seasonably
that which is open and apparent. In other words,
the duty of looking ahead imposes upon the driver, whether of an automobile or of domestic animals, the obligation to see whatever there may be
in the line of his vision, for a reasonable distance,
which will affect his driving, and, if his view is
unobstructed, he will be held in law to have seen
(vehicles) on the street in front of him, and will
be deemed negligent as a matter of law if he fails
to see that which should have been obvious." 1

Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practic Section Section 682.
One patent error in the appellant's position here
arises by reason of her proposed proof. Counsel significantly fails to comment on appellant's failure to keep a
proper lookout and yet proposed at pre-trial to rely on
the testimony of witnesses following ((a block" behind
appellant to establish the negligence of the deceased. In
other words, appellant is silent in her brief on the fact
that she looked but didn't see the perfectly obvious, even
in the face of the fact that the very witnesses she intended
to rely upon to establish her case, distinctly observed
from a position a block behind appellant all of the movements made by deceased's vehicle from a point 300 feet
east of the stop sign up to the point of impact. This, we
feel, is a real dilemma for appellant and properly and
completely establishes either that she was not looking
immediately prior to the accident, or that she was looking and failed to observe the obvious. Either of which
events establish that the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
8
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Appellant cites authority in her brief which allegedly establishes that the issue of contributory negligence
should in every instance be submitted to the jury. This,
of course, is not the rule. (See Hicks v. Skinner, 113
Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514. Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah
.505, 201 Pac. (2d) 495, and Covington v. Ca.rpenter, 4
Utah (2d) 378, 294 Pac. (2d) 788).

It seems well established by the foregoing authority
and well settled in Utah that a motion for a directed verdict will properly be granted if two fact elements are
present in a given case as a matter of law:
( 1)

That the plaintiff is negligent, and

( 2) That such negligence proximately contributed
to cause his or her own injury. (See also ·Martin v. Stevens,
(Utah), 243 Pac. (2d) 747.
In the case now before the court, there exists no
necessity to labor questions of human judgment. If three
occupants of motor vehicles following appellant ua block"
were able to clearly observe the movement of deceased's
vehicle for a distance of some 370 feet up to the point of
impact and the appellant, on the other hand, did not see
deceased's vehicle at night, with lights burning, until it
was directly in front of her ubarely moving" at a distance
of only uzo to 30 feet" then she was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The first element of ((negligence"
to sustain a directed verdict is obviously present, as found
by Judge Ellett.

9
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POINT NO. II
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO HER INJURIES
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Appellant was fully familiar with that portion of
U.S. 91 where the accident occurred, having driven the
same portion thereof weekly for some period of time. In
addition, the presence of the Draper road was constantly
brought to the attention of northbound traffic by reason of an appropriate sign on the highway. With this
knowledge in appellant, she negligently failed to observe
the deceased's vehicle proceed some 70 odd feet past the
stop sign and directly in front of her at a speed which,
she stated, was ((barely moving," until it was within u20
or 3 0 feet."
If we give this ((barely moving" a speed even as high
as 1 0 miles per hour it is elementary that the appellant
would travel a distance at 50 miles per hour equal to five
times that which the deceased covered. In other words,
after it was evident that deceased had passed the stop
sign, deceased traveled at least 70 feet while at the same
time appellant traveled five times as far or at least 3SO
feet. If we take her speed at 55 miles per hour, she
would have traveled at least 385 feet. In this distance,
and after deceased had proceeded past the stop sign, appellant could have come to a complete stop in approximately 184 feet and had 166 feet left to the point of
impact, or she could have proceeded within an additional
166 feet, nearly half way to the point of impact, and
still been able to come to a complete stop prior to the
point of impact. Further, during this 350 feet, the ap10
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pellant could reasonably have reduced her speed commensurate with the situation then confronting her or she
could reasonably have turned her car to the other northbound lane of traffic.
Of course, none of these precautionary measures
were taken, because the appellant was negligent in failing to observe the deceased's headlights or his vehicle until it was directly in front of her, ((barely moving" and
at a distance of only ((twenty or thirty feet." Under
these irrefutable admissions of the appellant, her negligence, as a matter of law, must be deemed to have proximately contributed to this accident and contributed to
the injuries of which she complains.
As generally stated in the Utah cases and reiterated
by the text writers,
(( ... the rule in automobile accident cases . . . IS
that any negligence of one, seeking redress for
injuries to his person or property through the
wrong of another contributing directly or proximately to such injury, to such an extent that but
for it he would not have been injured, will defeat
a cause of action founded on the primary negligence of the defendant, brought by the plaintiff
... " (See 4 Brashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law and Practice Section 27 61.)
We respectfully submit that the failure of the appellant to observe the vehicle of the deceased for some
320 odd feet did, as a matter of law, proximately cause
or contribute to the accident and the injuries about
which appellant complains.

11
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POINT NO. III.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DECEASED COULD
NOT BE CHARGED WITH WILFUL OR WANTON
MISCONDUCT.

Here, as on the previous two points, the appellant
ignores the significance and weight of her own testimony.
Initially, she assumes that the deceased was operating his
vehicle recklessly. Her comments in this regard include
an inuendo that the decedent had partaken of alcoholic
beverages notwithstanding the fact that on page 15 of
her brief she says: uin this case there was no evidence
of intoxication on the part of (the deceased.)" Therefore, she is left with the charge that the decedent drove
through a stop sign at a speed of 40 miles per hour to
substantiate her allegation of wilful and wanton misconduct. The evidence as to the speed would apparently
be adduced by a witness, 0. F. Stanley, who was traveling
about ua block" behind the appellant, and his observation, according to the brief of appellant, was made when
the deceased was approximately 300 feet east of the stop
sign. In direct contradiction of this testimony, appellant
herself stated that the speed of the deceased when first
observed was ubarely moving." It seems to us, therefore,
that the speed at which the deceased was traveling would,
as a matter of law, be excluded from that category labeled
uwilful and wanton misconduct," for
(( ... the injury must either have been intentionally
inflicted or produced by act so grossly negligent as
to exhibit reckless disregard for the safety of
others." ( 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law & Practice Sectio11 2771.)
12
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Certainly, ccbarely moving" is not such a speed.
The next point which the appellant raises to establish the wilful and wanton misconduct of the deceased
was the fact that he had proceeded through a stop sign.
Assuming, arguendo, that the deceased did proceed
through a stop sign without stopping, this, as a matter of
fact, could not ((proximately" cause the accident. It
seems to go without saying that proceeding through a
stop sign is not wilful and wanton misconduct, as appellant seems to think that it is, and we know of no case
which would support her contention. No presumption
can be made that such failure to observe constitutes wilful and wanton misconduct, and no case has been cited
by the appellant which establishes the rule to be the
contrary. As a matter of fact, decedents are presumed
to have acted reasonably and carefully as ordinarily prudent persons in operating their vehicles on the highway.
Here, of course, decedent cannot testify, but the physical
facts are such, and the undisputed evidence establishes,
that he had proceeded at least 70 feet past the stop sign at
the time of the impact and was traveling, when observed
by appellant, at a speed that was ccbarely moving." In
addition, he had practically negotiated his vehicle entirely across the wide northbound lanes of U.S. 91. We
must further mark well that it was the decedent who was
struck - not the appellant. It was the fact that appellant failed to observe and was operating her vehicle
at a speed which did not allow her to stop her vehicle
within her lights that caused this unfortunate occurrence.
Under the foregoing facts, the lower court rightly
held that there was no evidence which would establish

13
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a jury issue as to whether or not the deceased had opera ted
his vehicle in a wilful or wanton manner.
On the other hand, can be ignore the appellant's admitted failure to observe the obvious-her speed-the
fact that witnesses a block behind her were fully able to
make competent observations-her failure to make any
attempt to avoid this collision. Surely, if wilful and wanton misconduct was a factor contributing to the injuries
sustained by the appellant, appellant's own acts, as a
matter of law, would properly be characterized in this
category.
HWhen a party wilfully or wantonly contributes,
as a proximate cause to his own injury, he cannot recover, even though the defendant also acted
in a wilful and wanton manner. If the parties
were equally, in the same class, to blame in producing the injury, neither can recover." (Spiller
v. Griffen, 95 S.E. 133, 109 S.C. 78, 4 Blashfield

Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice Section 2776.)
The appellant takes comfort in making an analogy
to decided cases on the statutes relating to involuntary
manslaughter, but cases are substantially different as to
facts from the case now before this court. In addition,
these cases relate to criminal violations and the rules and
the construction placed upon the applicable statutes have
no relation to our problem. In State vs. Lingman, 97
Utah 180, 91 Pac. 2d 457 the defendant was traveling at
an excessive speed and the physical facts were such that
the excessive speed was established as a matter of law
and that such excessive speed would have substantially
caused or contributed to the death of the person struck by
14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

--the defendant. And, again, in State vs. Barker, 113 Utah
514, 196 Pac. 2d 723 the facts were such that the defendant proceeded through a stop sign and drove directly
into the care in which decedent was a passenger. It seems
to us extremely significant that both the Lingman case
and the Barker case were reversed by this court and no
discussions whatever was had regarding ((wilful and wan-:
ton misconduct." No precedent is set forth in either of
these decisions which would in any way support the position of the appellant in this proceeding. And, when
placed in proper context with the facts therein involved,
the limited application of the rule set forth in these involuntary manslaughter cases is self-evident.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, and the rules
announced by this court, the appellant herein was contributorily negligent in the operation of her vehicle as a
matter of law and the decision of the lower court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Respondent.
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